Do anti-bribery laws reduce the cost of equity? Evidence from the U.K. Bribery Act 2010 by Kim, Sue et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do anti-bribery laws reduce the cost of equity? Evidence from
the U.K. Bribery Act 2010
Citation for published version:
Kim, S, Rees, W & Sila, B 2020, 'Do anti-bribery laws reduce the cost of equity? Evidence from the U.K.
Bribery Act 2010', Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, vol. 47, no. 3-4, pp. 438-455.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12434
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/jbfa.12434
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. May. 2020
DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12434
Do anti-bribery laws reduce the cost of equity?
Evidence from the UKBribery Act 2010
Suhee Kim William Rees Vathunyoo Sila
University of Edinburgh Business School,
Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Correspondence
SuheeKim,University ofEdinburghBusiness
School, 29BuccleuchPlace, EdinburghEH89JS,
UnitedKingdom.
Email: suhee.kim@ed.ac.uk
Abstract
We examine the impact of the UK Bribery Act 2010 on the implied
cost of equity. We find a significant reduction in the cost of equity
amongst UK firms with high bribery exposure after the passage of
the Bribery Act. We further show that the Bribery Act improves
internal control systems and increases stock liquidity of firms with
high bribery exposure. Our results suggest that more stringent anti-
bribery regulations are not always bad for the firm.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Corruption is prevalent worldwide and is commonly cited as a significant deterrent to economic growth (Bardhan,
1997; Sensson, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). As a common form of corruption, corporate bribery is increasingly
becoming an important concern for policymakers as well as corporate stakeholders around the world (Cheung, Rau,
& Stouraitis, 2012; Karpoff, Lee, & Martin, 2017). The World Bank Institute estimates that $1 trillion a year is paid in
bribes (Rose-Ackerman, 2004). In a survey of corporatemanagers in 125 countries, D’Souza andKaufmann (2013) find
that more than 60% of participants believe that their competitors use bribes to secure a public contract. Similarly, the
Dow Jones State of Anti-Corruption Survey in 2014 finds that a third of companies claim to have lost business to unethical
competitors.
Becker (1968) models corporate misbehaviors as an economic decision that involves trade-offs between benefits
and costs. Paying bribes in foreign countries may potentially benefit firms by helping them expedite through the inef-
ficient bureaucratic process (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964). Indeed, Cheung et al. (2012) find that paying bribes brings
an average firm $11 per each dollar of bribe paid. Karpoff et al. (2017) estimate the costs and benefits of bribery and
find that, even after netting out expected financial and reputational costs, projects involving bribes remain profitable
to firms. Zeume (2017) documents a decline in value of UK firms since the Bribery Act 2010 came into force due to
reduced growth opportunities and concludes that paying bribes is a necessary cost of doing business.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and repro-
duction in anymedium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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Conversely, paying bribes can be costly to the firm. In addition to the risk of penalties and prosecutions (Murphy,
Shrieves, & Tibbs, 2009), corporate bribery may endanger the firm’s reputation and strain relations with stakehold-
ers (D’Souza & Kaufmann, 2013; Serafeim, 2014). Focus on paying bribes to win business can also distract firms from
investing in value-enhancing long-term projects (Birhanu, Gambardella, & Valentini, 2016). Furthermore, bribery may
make firms more opaque (see, e.g., Dass, Nanda, & Xiao, 2016). For instance, firms may conceal transactions to divert
funds for paying bribes. These bribery-related activities can potentially lead to firms becoming risky to outside share-
holders. This motivates us to study the relation between bribery and risk to shareholders.
We use the firm’s cost of equity as a proxy for risk to shareholders, and estimate the cost of equity using the resid-
ual income valuation model (Easton & Sommers, 2007; O’Hanlon & Steele, 2000). This approach has several appeals.
First, we can estimate the cost of equity using only market and accounting variables, which are readily available for
our sample firms. Second, we avoid the issues associated with using analyst earnings forecast data, such as forecast
bias and timeliness (Guay, Kothari, & Shu, 2011; Lys & Sohn, 1990). Finally, although our analysis does not focus on
a firm’s growth rate, the residual income valuation model allows us to estimate the growth rate simultaneously with
the implied cost of equity. As the literature suggests that growth is an important motive for firms to engage in bribery
(Cheung et al., 2012; Karpoff et al., 2017; Zeume, 2017), we are able to take directly into account the effect of bribery
on firm growthwhenwe estimate the effect of bribery on risk.
Identifying the effect of bribery on firm risk is challenging because bribes are usually undisclosed unless they are
detected, which is typically a rare event (Karpoff et al., 2017). To overcome this identification challenge, we use a
difference-in-difference design to exploit the significant improvement in bribery prevention generated by the UK
Bribery Act 2010 (hereafter “the Bribery Act”). The Bribery Act is the first UK legislation that explicitly addresses
bribery by corporations, and this legislation substantially increases the severity of penalties for corporations that pay
or take bribes, including cases where a corporation fails to prevent bribery because its internal control system is inad-
equate (Zeume, 2017). Before introducing the Bribery Act, the UK lagged far behind other Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries in terms of bribery prevention; now, its legislation on bribery is
among the strictest.1 Weargue that this significant change in the legal environment particularly affects firms thatwere
already operating in bribe-prone countries before the passage of the Bribery Act, and examine the law’s influence on
their cost of equity in a difference-in-difference setting.
Controlling for decline in the expected growth rate, we find that the Bribery Act is associated with a 4% reduction
in the implied cost of equity for firms with high bribery exposure.2 Given that our model estimates the average cost
of equity for these firms to be 12.5%, this is an economically substantial reduction, amounting to almost one-third of
these firms’ cost of equity. Our results suggest that the Bribery Act significantly reduces the risk of firms that operate
in bribe-prone countries.
We perform several robustness checks to validate our main findings. We show that our results are not sensi-
tive to how we classify firms as having high exposure to bribery, nor to several alternative earnings measures. We
further show that our results hold when including loss observations in our sample and performing value-weighted
instead of equally-weighted regressions (Easton, 2007; Easton & Sommers, 2007). Because the UK contemporane-
ously changed its tax regime on foreign corporate income, we alleviate the concern that this may have driven our doc-
umented change in the cost of equity by directly controlling for each firm’s exposure to tax on foreign income; we still
find that the change in cost of equity is only prevalent among firms with high exposure to foreign bribery. Further,
we validate the parallel trend assumptions in our difference-in-difference design (Atanasov & Black, 2016; Roberts
&Whited, 2012) by repeating our analysis using several artificial event years, and also performing our analysis on an
entropy-balanced sample (Hainmueller, 2012; Hainmueller & Xu, 2013). Overall, these additional results support our
1See Transparency International, “The Bribery Act”: https://www.transparency.org.U.K./our-work/business-integrity/bribery-act/
2Weconstruct ameasure of bribery exposure using Transparency International’s CorruptionPerceptions Index (CPI). Transparency International assigns each
country a score between 0 and 100, with a higher score indicating less exposure to corruption. For each firm, we compute an average CPI score, weighted by
the firm’s sales in different geographical segments.We classify “high bribery-risk” firms as thosewhoseweightedCPI score is less than or equal to the sample’s
25th percentile.
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main finding that the Bribery Act significantly reduces the cost of equity of firms with business operations in bribe-
prone countries.
We present evidence that the Bribery Act affects cost of equity by improving corporate internal control (Ashbaugh-
Skaife, Collins, Kinney, & Lafond, 2009; Beneish, Billings, & Hodder, 2008) and stock liquidity (e.g., Lang, Lins, &
Maffett, 2012; Pagano & Volpin, 2012). Using data from ASSET4’s anti-bribery database, we find that the Bribery Act
is associatedwith a significant improvement in corporate internal control to prevent bribery among firms that operate
in bribe-prone countries. Similarly, we find that the Bribery Act is associated with a significant decline in the bid-ask
spread and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure, suggesting that the stocks of firms exposed to bribery have become
more liquid after the Bribery Act passed. Overall, our results highlight the positive effects of the Bribery Act on a firm’s
cost of equity through improving the internal control system and stock liquidity.
This paper complements existing studies on the impact of foreign bribery prevention laws (e.g. Cheung et al.,
2012; Karpoff et al., 2017; Zeume, 2017). In particular, Zeume (2017) finds that the UK Bribery Act is associ-
ated with reduced growth opportunities and a decline in firm value. Our results suggest that, despite the nega-
tive overall effect on firm value, the Bribery Act improves corporations’ internal control systems and stock liquid-
ity. Consequently, equity shareholders demand a lower rate of return, which results in a lower estimated cost of
equity.
Our study also contributes to the debate on the costs and benefits of anti-bribery laws. Recent high-profile
cases have demonstrated to policymakers that foreign bribery remains prevalent.3 Proponents of anti-bribery laws
argue that bribery increases the overall cost of business operations and undermines business confidence (Kennedy &
Danielson, 2011). For instance, Christine Lagarde, as the Chair of the International Monetary Fund, refers to bribery
as “a corrosive force that eviscerates the vitality of business and stunts a country’s economic potential”.4 In contrast,
critics of these laws argue that they impose unnecessarily large compliance costs (e.g.,Weissmann& Smith, 2010). Our
results highlight the risk reduction benefit of anti-bribery laws.Despite the loss in business opportunities (Hines, 1995;
Zeume, 2017) and the increased compliance costs (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008; Collins, Uhlenbruck, & Rodriguez, 2009;
D’Souza & Kaufmann, 2013), strengthened internal control and enhanced corporate transparency can reduce adverse
selection risk of these firms (Kolstad &Wiig, 2009; Pagano&Roell, 1996), resulting in the reduction of required return
to shareholders.
2 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 UKBribery Act 2010
The Bribery Act was passed on March 25, 2009. This legislation is the first UK legislation that explicitly addresses
bribery by corporations, and substantially increases the severity of penalties compared to previous anti-bribery leg-
islation. The enactment of the Bribery Act has resulted in the UK moving from a country that failed to meet the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to be amongst the countries that have the most stringent anti-bribery legislation.5
Specifically, the Bribery Act imposes unlimited fines and jail terms up to ten years for bribing and taking bribes. The
legislation applies to individuals or companies that use bribes in the UK or elsewhere, and extends to corporations
3A recent example is Goldman Sachs’ involvement in alleged embezzlement from Malaysia’s state-run investment fund. According to court docu-
ments, Goldman Sachs’ employees paid bribes to state officials to secure large underwriting deals. See: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/business/
goldman-sachs-malaysia-investment-fund.html.
4See “Addressing corruption with clarity”, Brookings Institution, Washington DC, September, 18, 2017. Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/News/
Articles/2017/09/18/sp091817-addressing-corruption-with-clarity.
5UK legislation on bribery can be traced back to the Public BodiesCorruptAct 1889,which confined bribery to the public sector and criminalized the soliciting
or receiving of a bribe by a public officer. The law was reformed by the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, which expanded bribery to the private sector, and
the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, which further lightened the burden of proving corruption. Due to the complexity and uncertainty arising from having
several laws related to bribery, the UK failed to bring any foreign bribery case to court and risked being sanctioned by theOECD.
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with UK operations, employing UK citizens, or providing services to any UK organization. Unlike previous UK anti-
bribery laws and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the Bribery Act also covers facilitation payments that
aim to induce the performance of routine and obligatory government tasks (Trautman & Altenbaumer-Price, 2013). It
also has a wider scope of application, including all forms of bribes to not only foreign public officials but also private
operators.
The Bribery Act also imposes substantial fines if a corporation fails to prevent bribery because its internal control
system is insufficient. Corporations must establish effective anti-bribery systems and controls, such as: (i) adequate
procedures; (ii) top (board)-level commitment; (iii) risk assessment; (iv) due diligence; (v) communication and training;
and (vi) monitoring and review. Risk-based due diligence must also extend to counterparties like contractors and sup-
pliers. Overall, the Bribery Act has changed the basis for corporate criminal liability from personnel misconduct within
the firm to the quality of the system governing the firm’s activities (Mukwiri, 2015).
2.2 Bribery and cost of equity
Recent empirical evidence suggests that bribery in foreign countries facilitates business expansion and, ultimately, firm
growth. Cheung et al. (2012) find that each $1 paid in bribes increases a firm’s market valuation by $11. Karpoff et al.
(2017) find that, even when firms are caught bribing, the financial benefits from foreign bribery still more than offset
any associated fines, legal expenses, and reputational losses. They also find that reputational losses associated with
bribery are negligible.
Other studies contend that bribery prevention laws can potentially reduce a firm’s competitiveness in countries
where bribery is prevalent (Iriyama, Kishore, & Talukdar, 2016). Hines (1995) finds that the US Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act is associated with a significant reduction in operations by US firms in bribe-prone countries. Similarly, Zeume
(2017) finds that the Bribery Act reduces the growth of UK firms operating in corruption-prone countries and argues
that the Bribery Act has increased the cost of doing business overseas for UK firms.
The passage of the UK Bribery Act can result in a reduction in firm risk and, consequently, the cost of equity. The
literature recognizes corporate misconduct, including bribery, as a business risk (e.g., Lyon & Maher, 2005; Murphy
et al., 2009); consequently, a law that discourages managers from engaging in misconduct can potentially reduce a
firm’s business risk. Further, bribery can make firms more opaque: they may withhold financial information to divert
funds to pay for bribes (Dass et al., 2016; Smith, 2016). Information risk has been found tobepriced in by equity holders
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Beneish et al., 2008), and can thus affect the cost of equity. By criminalizing failure to
prevent bribery, the Bribery Act reduces managers’ incentives to engage in bribery, andmay thereby decrease a firm’s
risk and its cost of equity.
Hypothesis 1: The UKBribery Act is associated with a reduction in cost of equity.
On the other hand, the Bribery Act may increase a firm’s risk because it increases the propensity of and the costs
associated with being caught. Compared to previous UK legislation, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, and the
US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Bribery Act applies to a significantly wider range of activities and imposes
a much higher maximum fine. Therefore, the adverse financial consequences of being caught engaging in bribery
have become more severe. Further, the Bribery Act potentially disadvantages UK firms compared to competitors
not covered by the law, particularly local competitors in bribe-prone countries (Zeume, 2017). Prohibition of paying
bribes can also increase the likelihood of losing business opportunities to local competitors (De Jong, Tu, & van Ees,
2012).
Hypothesis 2: The UKBribery Act is associated with an increase in cost of equity.
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TABLE 1 Summary statistics
Variable N Mean St Dev p25 p50 p75
Segment CPI 6,071 69.339 13.270 61.920 74.240 80.810
Earnings Per Share 6,071 0.248 0.446 0.037 0.110 0.275
Book Value Per Share 6,071 1.681 3.190 0.401 0.899 1.861
LnMarket Capitalization 5,661 11.948 2.273 10.219 11.781 13.538
Book-to-Market 5,661 0.700 0.749 0.297 0.500 0.831
Leverage 5,661 0.161 0.150 0.018 0.137 0.257
Cash Flow fromOperation 5,661 0.097 0.090 0.049 0.089 0.139
Working Capital Ratio 1,927 1.542 1.131 0.923 1.296 1.734
Ownership Concentration 1,927 15.490 18.627 0.800 8.500 24.840
Anti-Bribery Score 1,982 2.141 2.121 0.000 2.000 4.000
Bid-Ask Spread 4,239 0.042 0.060 0.004 0.025 0.054
Illiquidity 4,239 0.004 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.002
Return Volatility 4,239 0.024 0.014 0.016 0.021 0.028
Ln Trading Volume 4,239 5.123 2.186 3.597 4.947 6.694
Stock Turnover 4,239 0.004 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.005
Notes: Segment CPI score is a sum product of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index score and the firm’s
sales in different geographical segments, scaled by total sales. Anti-Bribery Score is an index constructed using six indicators of
anti-bribery/corruption provisions provided by ASSET4. Other variables are from Datastream/Worldscope. All variables are
defined in Appendix A.
3 SAMPLE, VARIABLES, AND MODEL
3.1 Sample
Our sample comprises 6,071 observations covering 1,022 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) during the period 2003–2015.6 We obtain financial accounting and market
data from Datastream/Worldscope. Following prior studies (e.g., Easton, Taylor, Shroff, & Sougiannis, 2002; O’Hanlon
& Steele, 2000), we exclude observations with missing values, financial firms, and firms with negative book equity.
We also follow the prior literature (e.g., Dechow, Hutton, & Sloan, 1999; O’Hanlon & Steele, 2000) and exclude
observations with negative earnings, as these observations are unlikely to provide a meaningful anchor for valuation
(Easton, 2007), and the importance of earnings to valuation of loss firms can differ to valuation of profitable firms
(Collins, Pincus, & Xie, 1999). Table 1 presents the summary statistics of all key variables.
3.2 Measuring firm exposure to bribery
Following prior literature (Cheung et al., 2012; Karpoff et al., 2017; Zeume, 2017), we assume that a firm’s propensity
to engage in bribery is positively related to its exposure to bribe-prone countries. To measure firm-level exposure to
bribery, we use Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) tomeasure the prevalence of bribery
6We exclude 2009 from our sample period, as the lawwas passed in 2009 but became effective in 2010.
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in a country, and construct aweighted-average Segment CPI score for each firmbased on its sales in different geograph-
ical segments.7 Specifically, our firm-level measure for exposure to bribery is:
Segment CPIi,t =
S∑
s=1
(
Segment Salesi,t,s
Total Salesi,t
× CPIs,t
)
(1)
where CPIs,t is the CPI score for geographic segment s in year t. The CPI score ranges from 0 to 100, with a
lower score indicating that a country is more prone to bribes. We then construct an indicator variable, Bribery
Exposure, which equals 1 if Segment CPI is less than or equal to the 25th percentile of the firms in our sam-
ple, and 0 otherwise. The firms with Bribery Exposure equal to 1 are likely to be more strongly affected by the
Bribery Act.
3.3 Empirical model: The residual income valuationmodel
We follow Easton and Sommers (2007) by using the residual income valuationmodel based on current accounting and
price data:
epsjt
bpsjt−1
= 𝛿0 + 𝛿1
pjt − bpsjt
bpsjt−1
+ 𝜉jt (2)
where 𝛿0 = r and 𝛿1 = (r − g′)∕ (1 + g′).
This model is an adaptation of the model employed in O’Hanlon and Steele (2000),8 which allows us to simultane-
ously estimate the implied cost of equity (r) and the expected growth rate in the residual income (g′) from accounting
and price information available at the end of period t. We use Equation (2) as the basis for our regression analysis.
Specifically, the estimated coefficient for the intercept term (𝛿0) provides an estimate of the implied cost of capital,
which is our main parameter of interest (Easton, 2007; Easton & Sommers, 2007).
While the expected growth rate is not this study’s main focus, we avoid potential bias from arbitrary assumptions
of this rate by estimating it simultaneously with the implied cost of equity. Further, using current realized earnings
allows us to circumvent the problems associated with analyst earnings forecast data. For instance, Guay et al. (2011)
identify a common delay between stock price changes and analysts updating their forecasts. Lys and Sohn (1990) find
that analysts’ short-term earnings forecasts contain only 66% of the information reflected in security prices before
the forecast release date. Additionally, using only price and accounting variables allows us to includemore firms in our
sample.
We extend Equation (2) to allowboth the implied cost of equity and growth rate to change after the BriberyActwas
passed. First, we define a dummy variable Bribery Act, which equals 1 from 2010 to 2015 and 0 from2003 to 2008, and
include this variable in our model as follows:
epsjt
bpsjt−1
= 𝛿0 + 𝛿′0 ∗Bribery Act + 𝛿1 ∗
pjt − bpsjt
bpsjt−1
+ 𝛿′1 ∗Bribery Act ∗
pjt − bpsjt
bpsjt−1
+ 𝜉jt (3)
7Where a company reports the geographic segment as combined regions or as continents, the average ofCPI scores fromall countries in the region/continents
is used.
8Whereas Easton and Sommers (2007) use the financial year end’s market price (pjt) for the numerator of the right-hand-side variable (pjt − bpsjt), O’Hanlon
and Steel (2000) use the average of a firm’s market price at the end of the financial reporting month and six subsequent months. As our analysis compares the
cost of equity before and after theBriberyActwas passed, we follow the former approach to avoid using information that is not available in the current period.
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As the Bribery Act is likely to disproportionately affect firms that operate in bribe-prone countries, we include an
indicator variable Bribery Exposure, which equals 1 for firms with high exposure to bribe-prone countries, and 0 other-
wise. The resulting difference-in-difference specification is as follows:
epsjt
bpsjt−1
= 𝛿0 + 𝛿′0 ∗Bribery Act + 𝛿
′′
0 ∗Bribery Act ∗ Bribery Exposure + 𝛿1 ∗
pjt − bpsjt
bpsjt−1
+ 𝛿′1∗Bribery Act ∗
pjt − bpsjt
bpsjt−1
+ 𝛿′′1 ∗Bribery Act ∗ Bribery Exposure ∗
pjt − bpsjt
bpsjt−1
+ 𝛿2 ∗Bribery Exposure + 𝛿3 ∗Bribery Exposure ∗
pjt − bpsjt
bpsjt−1
+ 𝜉jt . (4)
Ourmain coefficient of interest is 𝛿
′′
0
, which captures the change in implied cost of equity for firmswith high bribery
exposure after the Bribery Act passed, relative to the change for firms with low exposure to bribery.9
4 RESULTS
4.1 Main results: The UKBribery Act 2010 and the implied cost of equity
Table 2presents ourmain results.We first validate our residual incomevaluationmodel by estimatingEquation (2). The
results in Column (1) indicate that the average cost of equity for our sample firms during 2003–2015 is 10.4%, which is
in line with the average rate of return on UK stocks.10 In Column (2), which includes the Bribery Act indicator variable
to allow both implied cost of equity and implied growth rate to change after the Bribery Act passed (Equation 3), we
find that the average cost of equity is 11.3% in 2003–2008, and decreases by 1.7% to 9.6% in 2010–2015.
Column (3) presents our difference-in-difference estimation (Equation 4). Controlling for changes in the expected
growth rate, we find that the coefficient for Bribery Act ∗ Bribery Exposure is negative and significant, indicating that
the Bribery Act is associated with a reduction in the cost of equity among high bribery-exposure firms relative to
firms with low bribery exposure. The coefficient estimates in Column (3) suggest that the Bribery Act has reduced the
cost of equity for high bribery-exposure firms by 4.0% (1.1% + 2.9%), whereas the reduction is 1.1% for low bribery-
exposure firms. Since Column (3) estimates that the average cost of equity for high bribery-exposure firms is 12.5%
(11.1% + 1.4%), this reduction in the cost of equity is economically substantial, amounting to almost one-third of the
average cost of equity of high bribery-exposure firms.
Column (4) includes year and firm fixed effects to eliminate the influence of any unobserved heterogeneity that is
time invariant across firms and any market-wide variation across time periods. We find that the coefficient for Bribery
Act ∗ Bribery Exposure remains statistically significant (p < 0.05). We also find that including firm and year fixed effects
results in a larger estimated effect on the implied cost of equity (3.6%, compared to 2.9% in Column 3).
Overall, our main results indicate that the Bribery Act has significantly lowered the cost of equity for firms exposed
to bribe-prone countries. Our evidence suggests that bribery regulations reduce the risk for equity holders, leading
them to demand a lower rate of return for their investment.
9Equation 4 contains four nestedmodels estimating four implied costs of equity (the intercepts) for four groups of firms: (1) firmswith lowexposure to bribery
before the Bribery Act passed (r = 𝛿0); (2) firmswith low exposure to bribery after the Bribery Act passed (r = 𝛿0 + 𝛿
′
0
); (3) firmswith high exposure to bribery
before the Bribery Act passed (r = 𝛿0 + 𝛿2); and (4) firms with high exposure to bribery after the Bribery Act passed (r = 𝛿0 + 𝛿
′
0
+ 𝛿′′
0
+ 𝛿2). To measure
the effect of the Bribery Act 2010 on firms with high exposure to bribery, we compare the difference between (1) the change in the implied cost of equity
amonghighbribery-exposure firmspre- andpost-BriberyAct, (𝛿0 + 𝛿
′
0
+ 𝛿′′
0
+ 𝛿2) − (𝛿0 + 𝛿2) = 𝛿
′
0
+ 𝛿′′
0
; and (2) the change in the implied cost of equity among
low bribery-exposure firms pre- and post-Bribery Act, (𝛿0 + 𝛿
′
0
) − (𝛿0) = 𝛿′0. The difference between these two groups is (𝛿
′
0
+ 𝛿′′
0
) − 𝛿′
0
= 𝛿′′
0
which is the
coefficient for Bribery Act ∗ Bribery Exposure in Equation 4—ourmain coefficient of interest.
10The average return on the FTSE 100 Index was 8.4% during 2003–2015 (or 11.5% if 2008 is excluded).
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TABLE 2 The UKBribery Act 2010 and the implied cost of equity
Dependent Variable= epst/bpst−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bribery Act × Bribery Exposure −0.029* −0.036**
(0.017) (0.018)
Bribery Act −0.017** −0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
Bribery Exposure 0.014 0.021
(0.012) (0.015)
(pt − bpst)/bpst−1 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.051***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
(pt − bpst)/bpst−1 × Bribery Act −0.000 −0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
(pt − bpst)/bpst−1 × Bribery Exposure −0.004 −0.003
(0.005) (0.006)
(pt − bpst)/bpst−1 × Bribery Act × Bribery Exposure 0.008 0.010
(0.008) (0.006)
Intercept 0.104*** 0.113*** 0.111***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Year fixed effects No No No Yes
Firm fixed effects No No No Yes
Observations 6,071 6,071 6,071 6,071
Adjusted R2 0.503 0.504 0.504 0.455
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the extended residual income valuationmodel (Equation 3). The dependent variable
is epst/bpst−1, earnings per share scaled by lagged book value per share. Bribery Act is a dummy variable which equals one in
2010–2015, and zero in 2003–2008. Bribery Exposure is a dummy variable which equals one when a firm’s weighted average
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score is in the bottom quartile of the sample. (pt − bpst)/bpst−1 is the difference between
market price and book value per share scaled by lagged book value per share. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at
the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
4.2 Robustness checks
Table 3 presents the results from various robustness checks. Panel A shows that our main results are not sensitive to
howwe classify firms as having high exposure to bribery. In our baseline results, the indicator variable Bribery Exposure
is equal to 1 when a firm’s weighted-average Segment CPI score is equal to or below the 25th percentile, and 0 oth-
erwise. In Columns (1)–(4), we change this threshold to equal to or below the 10th, 20th, 30th, and 40th percentiles,
respectively. We find that the coefficient for Bribery Act ∗ Bribery Exposure is statistically significant when firms with
high bribery exposure are classified as those with a weighted-average Segment CPI score equal to or below the 10th or
20th percentile (Columns 1 and 2), but becomesweaker aswe relax this threshold in Columns (3) and (4). These results
support our conjecture that the Bribery Act has more strongly affected firms with higher exposure to bribe-prone
countries. In Column (5), the Bribery Exposure indicator is replacedwith the negative value of the weighted-average Seg-
ment CPI scores; our main finding continues to hold.11 In Column (6), we use FTSE4Good bribery exposure data as an
11As a lower Segment CPI score suggests that a country is less transparent andmore bribe prone, we use the negative value so that the coefficient is in the same
direction as in our main results.
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TABLE 3 Robustness checks
Panel A: Alternativemeasures for bribery exposure
Alternative thresholds for Segment CPI Scores Raw Segment FTSE 4Good
10th percentile 20th percentile 30th percentile 40th percentile CPI Scores Bribery Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bribery Act × Bribery
Exposure
−0.057* −0.035* −0.024 −0.020 −0.128** −0.045**
(0.032) (0.021) (0.017) (0.015) (0.060) (0.022)
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,071 6,071 6,071 6,071 6,071 2,700
Adjusted R2 0.439 0.439 0.437 0.437 0.438 0.545
Panel B: Alternative earnings proxies
Analyst Forward Earnings
I/B/E/S Actual EPS Forecasts (Easton et al., 2002)
(1) (2)
Bribery Act × Bribery Exposure −0.030* −0.017**
(0.017) (0.008)
Other variables Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 5,381 4,358
Adjusted R2 0.292 0.426
Panel C: Sensitivity test to the inclusion of loss observations
Full Sample (FTSE+AIM) FTSE AIM
Dependent Variable= epst/bpst−1 (1) (2) (3)
Bribery Act × Bribery Exposure (equally weighted) −0.018 −0.053* 0.030
(0.023) (0.027) (0.032)
Bribery Act × Bribery Exposure (value weighted) −0.031*** −0.023*** −0.013**
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Observations 8,900 3,965 4,935
Observations with earnings greater than zero 6,071 (68%) 3,325 (84%) 2,746 (56%)
Observations with earnings less than zero 2,829 (32%) 640 (16%) 2,189 (44%)
Panel D: Controlling for tax exposure on foreign income
Tax Exposure 1 Tax Exposure 2
Dependent variable= epst/bpst−1 (1) (2)
Bribery Act × Bribery Exposure −0.042** −0.040*
(0.017) (0.024)
Bribery Exposure 0.032* 0.020
(0.017) (0.017)
(Continues)
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
Panel D: Controlling for tax exposure on foreign income
Tax Exposure 1 Tax Exposure 2
Dependent variable= epst/bpst−1 (1) (2)
Bribery Act × Tax Exposure −0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.027)
Tax Exposure 0.004 0.011
(0.003) (0.022)
Other variables Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 6,071 6,071
Adjusted R2 0.458 0.456
Notes: Panel A replaces Bribery Exposure with alternative measures for firms operating in bribery prone countries. Columns
(1)−(4) change the threshold for high bribery exposure firms to those with weighted-average Segment CPI score below 10th,
20th, 30th, and 40th percentiles. Column (5) uses negative values of rawweighted-average Segment CPI scores and Column (6)
uses FTSE4Good Bribery Risk. Column (1) of Panel B uses I/B/E/S Actual EPS as the proxy for earnings, instead of net income
available to common shareholders. Column (2) of Panel B uses analyst forward earnings forecasts and employs the residual
incomevaluationmodel fromEaston et al. (2002). PanelC includes loss observations into the sample andestimates the residual
income valuation model using equally-weighted and value-weighted regressions. Panel D include measures for corporate tax
exposure on foreign income as additional control variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. *,
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
alternative data source to the CPI, and continue to find consistent results.12 Overall, these results provide further evi-
dence that firms with high bribery exposure have experienced a significant decrease in their cost of equity since the
Bribery Act passed.
Panel B of Table 3 shows that our findings hold when using alternative proxies for earnings. Column (1) uses I/B/E/S
Actual EPS, which excludes one-time items and, consequently, may bemore representative of a firm’s sustainable earn-
ings (Easton, 2007). Column (2) follows Easton et al. (2002) by using I/B/E/S forecast EPS instead of reported earn-
ings.13 The results in both columns are consistent with ourmain results.
InPanelCofTable3,we test the sensitivity of our findings to including loss observations.While ourmain tests follow
prior studies by excluding observations with negative earnings from the sample (e.g., Dechow et al., 1999; O’Hanlon
& Steele, 2000), only considering healthier firms may lead to biased inferences (Easton, 2007). For brevity, we only
include the coefficient estimates forBribery Act ∗Bribery Exposure. In Column (1), we find that the coefficient forBribery
Act ∗Bribery Exposure is negative but not statistically significant. This is potentially due to the large proportion of obser-
vationswith negative earnings in this sample (32%),which suggests that this estimate for cost of equitymay not be reli-
able (Easton, 2007). As our sample includes firms listed on the FTSE or the AIM, Columns (2) and (3) present separate
results for observations from these two stock markets.We find that the coefficient for Bribery Act ∗ Bribery Exposure is
negative and significant among FTSE firms, which notably have the smallest proportion of loss observations (16%). The
overall results indicate that a large proportion of loss observations significantly influences the cost of equity estima-
tion. Following Easton (2007) and Easton and Sommers (2007), we also estimate value-weighted regressions to reduce
12FTSE4Good bribery exposure data evaluates firms based on their operating industries, countries, and the extent to which the firms are involved in public
contracts.We thank FTSE for providing us with the data.
13The residual income valuation model in Easton et al. (2002) is
epsjt+1
bpsjt
= 𝛾0 + 𝛾1
Pjt
bpsjt
+ 𝜇jt , where epsjt+1 is the next period’s earnings forecasted at t, 𝛾0 is
the implied growth rate, and 𝛾1 is the difference between the cost of equity and the implied growth rate. To directly estimate the cost of equity,we algebraically
transform this model to
epsjt+1
pjt
= 𝛿0 + 𝛿1
bpst−pjt
pjt
+ 𝜇jt , where the intercept term 𝛿0 is the cost of equity.
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the influence of negative earnings, which tend to be from smaller firms in the sample.We find that the value-weighted
coefficients for Bribery Act ∗ Bribery Exposure are negative and statistically significant across all three columns.
Panel D alleviates the concern that our results are confounded by the contemporaneous passage of the Finance
Act 2009, whereby the UK’s tax regime transitioned from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. After
2009,UKmultinationals ceased to pay dividend tax on earnings from foreign countrieswith lower corporation tax rates
than the UK’s (Liu, 2018).14 Because the effect of this tax reform is likely to manifest in financial year end 2010, we
directly control for the tax exposure of UK firms on their foreign income. Specifically, we construct two measures for
tax exposure:
Tax Exposure 1 is defined as the sum product of foreign sales and the foreign corporation tax rate scaled by total
sales:
Tax Exposure 1i,t =
S∑
s=1
Segment Salesi,s,t × Tax Rates,t
Total Salesi,t
(5)
Tax Exposure 2 is defined as the sum product of foreign sales ratio and a dummy variable that equals 1 when the
foreign corporation tax rate is below the UK’s corporation tax rate:15
Tax Exposure 2i,t =
S∑
s=1
Segment Salesi,s,t × D(Tax Rate < UK Tax Rate)s,t
Total Salesi,t
(6)
In Columns (1) and (2) of Panel D of Table 3, we include the two foreign tax exposure variables and their interaction
with Bribery Act as additional control variables in the model. We find in both columns that Bribery Act ∗ Tax Exposure
does not enter themodel significantly, implying that the variation inUK firms’ tax exposure on foreign income does not
explain the change in their cost of equity after the Bribery Act passed. By contrast, we continue to find that the coeffi-
cient for Bribery Act ∗ Bribery Exposure is negative and statistically significant. These results suggest that the reduction
in cost of equity is more likely to have resulted from the Bribery Act than the Finance Act 2009.
4.3 Artificial event years and covariate balancing
The validity of our difference-in-difference design hinges on the parallel-trend assumption (Atanasov & Black, 2016;
Roberts &Whited, 2012): specifically, absent the Bribery Act, the cost of equity for all our sample firms shouldmove in
the same way regardless of their exposure to bribe-prone countries. In this section, we perform additional sensitivity
tests to check the validity of this assumption.
We first rule out the possibility that our results are driven by any pre-existing trend (Atanasov & Black, 2016) by
performing several falsification tests. Specifically, we repeat our analysis using 2005, 2006, and 2007 as artificial event
years, and present the results in Columns (1)–(3) of Table 4. As expected, the coefficients for Bribery Act ∗ Bribery Expo-
sure are not statistically significant whenwe use these artificial event years. These results suggest that our findings are
unlikely to be due to any pre-existing trend.
Wealso combineourdifference-in-differencedesignwith covariate balancing to ensure that theobservations in our
treatment and control groups are similar along several dimensions of covariates. Specifically, we use entropy balancing
(Hainmueller, 2012; Hainmueller & Xu, 2013) to impose a weighting scheme on our observations, such that the means
and variances of all covariates are exactly identical across treatment and control groups. Entropy balancing has several
14Prior to the 2009 reform, UK companies paid the difference between the UK corporation tax rate and the applicable foreign corporation tax rate on any
income repatriated into the UK. Income from countries whose tax rate was higher than the UK’s incurred no additional tax charge.
15We use 2010 tax rates obtained from the OECD Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rates, available at https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode =
Table_II1.
12 KIM ET AL.
TABLE 4 Validating the parallel trend assumption
Artificial Event Years
2005 2006 2007 Entropy Balanced Sample
Dependent Variable= epst/bpst−1 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Bribery Act × Bribery Exposure −0.033 −0.011 −0.018 −0.040***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.018)
Other variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,071 6,071 6,071 5,445
Adjusted R2 0.456 0.455 0.456 0.664
Notes: Columns (1), (2), and (3) present residual income valuation estimations in which the year the Bribery Act indicator vari-
ables are set to be equal to onewhen the observation year is greater than or equal to 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively. Col-
umn (4) presents the residual income valuation estimation on an entropy balanced sample (Hainmueller, 2012; Hainmueller
& Xu, 2013), in which 1,348 high bribery exposure observations are matched with 4,907 low bribery exposure observations.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
advantages over other matching methods, such as propensity score matching or nearest-neighbor covariate match-
ing. First, entropy balancing can be used to obtain a higher degree of balance for a large set of covariates, because
it directly searches for a set of observation weights that give the treatment and control groups the same means and
variances (Hainmueller, 2012). Second, thematching scheme in entropy balancing allows theweight of observations to
continuously vary across different units (Hainmueller&Xu, 2013). Therefore, unlike nearest-neighbor or radiusmatch-
ing schemes, we do not need to keep or drop observations from thematched sample based on any arbitrary threshold.
Consequently, we can retain a larger proportion of observations in the matched sample. Finally, the weights result-
ing from entropy balancing can be used flexibly with any standard estimators, including the difference-in-difference
estimator.
We use entropy balancing to match our observations along several key covariates that can influence a firm’s
cost of equity: market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, cash flow from operations, stock return, sales growth,
and leverage (see, e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Lang et al., 2012).16 The estimation using the entropy-matched
sample is presented in Column (4) of Table 4. Consistent with our baseline results, the coefficient for Bribery Act
∗ Bribery Exposure is negative and statistically significant. This balanced-sample result provides further confidence
that our main findings are unlikely to be driven by differences between firms with high and low exposure to
bribery.
5 POTENTIAL MECHANISMS
We find that the passage of the Bribery Act is associatedwith a significant reduction in cost of equity among firmswith
high exposure to bribe-prone countries. We postulate that this reduction is due to firms becoming less risky to equity
holders, such that they demand a lower rate of return (Lang et al., 2012). This section provides evidence of potential
mechanisms throughwhich the Bribery Act reduces firm risk.
16In our baseline sample, the average high bribery-exposure firm is larger, has a lower book-to-market ratio, and has higher operating cash flows. These differ-
ences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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TABLE 5 The UKBribery Act 2010 and corporate internal control
Dependent Variable= Anti-Bribery Score (1) (2)
Bribery Act × Bribery Exposure 0.506** 0.488**
(0.200) (0.198)
Bribery Exposure −0.487** −0.475**
(0.193) (0.197)
Leverage −0.042
(0.574)
Working Capital Ratio −0.094
(0.072)
Ln Ownership Concentration 0.004
(0.004)
Book-to-Market 0.343*
(0.203)
LnMarket Capitalization 0.161
(0.133)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,982 1,927
Adjusted R2 0.602 0.602
Notes: The dependent variable isAnti-Bribery Score, an index constructed using six indicators related to anti-bribery/corruption
provisions provided by ASSET 4. ASSET4’s anti-bribery data comprise six indicators, namely whether the company:
(1) mentions a public commitment to anti-bribery/corruption at the senior management or board level; (2) strengthens anti-
bribery/corruption in its code of conduct; (3) adopts an internal management tool for bribery/corruption such as hotlines or
whistleblowing systems; (4) has apolicy to copewithbribery/corruption in business transactions; (5) communicates onbribery-
relevant issues with employees in organizational processes; and (6) conducts employee training on anti-bribery/corruption.
Other variables are defined in Appendix A. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are presented in parentheses. *,
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
5.1 Strengthened internal control system
One potential mechanism through which the Bribery Act decreases the cost of equity is by improving corporate inter-
nal control systems. The Bribery Act requires firms to implement an internal control system for bribery and corrup-
tion prevention and imposes significant personal and legal liability on managers if this system fails to prevent bribery
(Bargeron, Lehn, & Zutter, 2010; Litvak, 2008). This should encourage firms to improve their internal control system to
reduce the probability of negative outcomes associatedwith paying bribes (Birhanu et al., 2016; D’Souza &Kaufmann,
2013; Serafeim, 2014). Prior literature has evidenced the association between a firm’s internal control system and its
cost of equity (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Beneish et al., 2008).
In Table 5, we construct a variable Anti-Bribery Score from ASSET4’s anti-bribery database.17 The variable Anti-
Bribery Score ranges from0 to 6, with a higher score indicating that the firm has a stronger internal control system. Col-
umn (1) employs the difference-in-difference estimationwithAnti-Bribery Score as the dependent variable.We find that
the coefficient forBribery Act ∗Bribery Exposure is positive and significant, suggesting that, among firmswith high expo-
sure to bribery, the Bribery Act is associated with a significant improvement in corporate internal control to prevent
17ASSET4’s anti-briberydata comprise six indicators, namelywhether the company: (1)mentions apublic commitment to anti-bribery/corruption at the senior
management or board level; (2) strengthens anti-bribery/corruption in its code of conduct; (3) adopts an internalmanagement tool for bribery/corruption such
as hotlines or whistleblowing systems; (4) has a policy to cope with bribery/corruption in business transactions; (5) communicates on bribery-relevant issues
with employees in organizational processes; and (6) conducts employee training on anti-bribery/corruption.
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TABLE 6 The UKBribery Act 2010 and stock liquidity
Ln Bid-Ask Spread Ln Illiquidity
Dependent Variable= (1) (2) (3) (4)
Bribery Act × Bribery Exposure −0.349*** −0.227*** −0.283*** −0.113*
(0.067) (0.055) (0.103) (0.069)
Bribery Exposure 0.201*** 0.158*** 0.107 0.118*
(0.068) (0.055) (0.104) (0.069)
LnMarket Capitalization −0.462*** −0.736***
(0.027) (0.039)
Return Volatility 5.104*** 0.002***
(1.717) (0.000)
Ln Trading Volume −0.125*** −0.323***
(0.036) (0.082)
Ln Stock Turnover 0.028 −0.287***
(0.034) (0.068)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,239 4,239 4,952 4,931
Adjusted R2 0.262 0.434 0.227 0.542
Notes: The dependent variables are Ln Bid-Ask Spread (Columns 1 and 2), defined as the logarithm of daily closing ask price
less the closing bid price scaled by the midpoint of the closing ask and bid prices, and Ln Illiquidity (Columns 3 and 4), defined
as the logarithm of the average of daily ratio of absolute stock return to GBP trading volume multiplied by 1,000 (Amihud,
2002).Other variables are defined inAppendixA.Weexclude observations in 2014–2015due to the exemption of StampDuty
Reserve Tax for trading on AIM and LSE high-growth stocks. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are presented
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
bribery. InColumn (2),we include several firmcharacteristics that can influence a firm’s internal control system:market
capitalization, book-to-market ratio, leverage, working capital ratio, and ownership concentration (see e.g., Doyle, Ge,
&McVay, 2007); our results continue to hold. Overall, these findings indicate that the Bribery Act is indeed associated
with improved internal control among high bribery-exposure firms.
5.2 Increase in stock liquidity
As an enhanced internal control system can improve corporate transparency by mitigating management’s ability to
distort financial information or engage in concealed transactions (Dass et al., 2016; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003),
the Bribery Act could reduce the information asymmetry between the firm and outsider shareholders (Beneish et al.,
2008). This would, in turn, result in better stock liquidity by reducing the need for private information gathering and
also reducing adverse selection in trading of the firm’s stock (Chung, Elder, & Kim, 2010; Diamond &Verrecchia, 1991;
Francis, LaFond,Olsson,&Schipper, 2007;Holmstrom&Tirole, 1993).Asbetter liquidity reduces the cost of equity (e.g.
Lang et al., 2012; Lin, Singh, & Yu, 2009), the improvement in stock liquidity could be a potential mechanism through
which the Bribery Act reduces cost of equity.
Table 6 examines the effect of the Bribery Act on two key proxies for stock liquidity: (1) the bid-ask spread
(Easley & O’Hara, 1987; Glosten & Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985); and (2) Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure. Col-
umn (1) shows that the bid-ask spread significantly decreases after the Bribery Act passed. In Column (2), we
follow prior literature (e.g., Amiram, Owens, & Rozenbaum, 2016; Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008) by including
additional control variables: market capitalization, return volatility, trading volume, and stock turnover; our results
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continue to hold. Columns (3) and (4) present consistent evidence when using Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure.
Overall, these findings offer evidence that the stock liquidity of high bribery-exposure firms increased after theBribery
Act passed.
6 CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the effect of the Bribery Act on cost of equity.We find that the implied cost of equity of firmswith
high exposure to bribe-prone countries has significantly decreased since the Bribery Act was passed. Among the same
firms, we also find that the Bribery Act is associated with improvement in the corporate internal control system and
also stock liquidity, suggesting that these are potential mechanisms throughwhich the Bribery Act reduces firm risk.
With the costs and benefits of anti-bribery laws still being debated by policymakers and academics, our results
contribute by showing the positive impact of one such law. Despite the concern that these laws may impede busi-
ness expansion in some foreign markets and increase compliance costs, we highlight significant benefits in terms of
improved internal control and stock liquidity. Our findings suggest that anti-bribery laws can benefit equity investors.
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
Variables Definitions
Earnings Per Share
(epst)
Net income available to common shareholder (net income before extraordinary items and after
preferred dividends;Worldscope codeWC01751) scaled by shares outstanding (WC05301)
Book Value Per Share
(bpst)
Book value of ordinary equity (WC03501) divided by shares outstanding (WC05301)
Stock Price (pt) Year-end close price (WC05001)
Bribery Act Indicator variable= 1when the observation year is greater than or equal to 2010 (after the UK
Bribery Act 2010 passes),= 0 otherwise
Bribery Exposure Indicator variable= 1when Segment CPI Score is equal to or below the 25th percentile,= 0
otherwise
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Variables Definitions
Segment CPI Score Sum-product of a firm’s geographical segment sales and the geographical segment’s Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) score (reported by Transparency International), scaled by total sales.
When the company reports consolidated sales at the continent level, the average CPI score is
used. Geographic segment sales are obtained fromWC19601,WC19611–WC19691 and the
geographic segment regions are obtained fromWC19600,WC19610–WC19690
LnMarket
Capitalization
Natural logarithm of firmmarket capitalization (WC08001)
Book-to-Market Book value of common equity (WC03501) scaled bymarket value of equity (WC08001)
Leverage Total debt (WC03255) scaled by total assets (WC02999)
Cash Flow from
Operations
Cash flow from operations (WC04860) scaled by total assets (WC02999)
Sales Growth Sales (WC01001) from fiscal year tminus sales from fiscal year t−1 scaled by sales from fiscal
year t−1.
Stock Return Adjusted stock prices (DataStream code P#S) at year end of tminus stock price at t−1, scaled by
stock price at t−1
Anti-Bribery Score An index constructed as the sum of six indicator variables related to anti-bribery/corruption
provisions provided by ASSET 4. ASSET4’s anti-bribery data comprise six indicators, namely
whether the company: (1) mentions a public commitment to anti-bribery/corruption at the
senior management or board level; (2) strengthens anti-bribery/corruption in its code of
conduct; (3) adopts an internal management tool for bribery/corruption such as hotlines or
whistleblowing systems; (4) has a policy to copewith bribery/corruption in business
transactions; (5) communicates on bribery-relevant issues with employees in organizational
processes; and (6) conducts employee training on anti-bribery/corruption
Working Capital Ratio Current assets (WC02201) scaled by current liability (WC03101)
Ownership
Concentration
Proportion of equity held by shareholders with at least 5 percent of equity ownership within the
firm (WC08021)
Bid-Ask Spread Annual average of the daily closing ask price (Datastream code PA) less the closing bid price
(Datastream code PB) scaled by themidpoint
Illiquidity Annual average of daily ratio of absolute stock return to dollar trading volume (VO∗P#S)
Return Volatility Annual standard deviation of daily stock returns
Trading Volume Annual average of daily trading volumes (Datastream code VO)
Stock Turnover Annual average of daily trading volumes (Datastream code VO) scaled by the number of free
float shares outstanding (Datastream code FFNOSH)
